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Economics of Convention Meets Foucault 
Rainer Diaz-Bone ∗ 
Abstract: »Economics of convention meets Foucault«. The contribution exam-
ines concepts and the methodology of Michel Foucault from the standpoint of 
the French institutionalist approach of economics of convention (in short EC). 
EC is briefly introduced. Then, it is argued that Foucault should be regarded as 
an “ally” for EC, because his theory shares main positions with EC, but Foucault 
also provides concepts and methodological strategies, which could improve EC’s 
capabilities to analyze practices and strategies of convention-based processes 
as critique, justification and the social construction of qualities and worth. 
Some representatives of EC have already adopted Foucaultian concepts. Fou-
cault also pioneered the analysis in domains, highly relevant for EC, as in the 
field of law and neoliberalism, but these works are not well recognized so far. 
Moreover, Foucault began the study of individual’s strategies of self-conduct 
and self-formation, which EC approached later on as well. The article claims 
that it is especially Foucault’s notions of episteme and power as well as Fou-
caultian discourse analysis, which offer innovative theoretical and methodolog-
ical perspectives for EC. 
Keywords: Foucault, economics of convention, discourse, discourse analysis, 
law, technologies of the self, regimes of engagement, episteme, power. 
1.   Introduction 
The institutionalist approach of economics of convention (convention theory, in 
short EC) has become an international scientific movement for the analysis of 
economic coordination, of processes of the construction of collectively 
recognized values and of economic dispositives. EC nowadays can be 
conceived not only as an economic approach, but as a socio-economic as well 
as a sociological approach. As part of the new French social sciences, EC 
recombines pragmatist ways of thinking with structuralist conceptual elements, 
thereby addressing classical as well as contemporary questions of social 
science research and methodology.1 EC was developed in the context of French 
                                                             
∗  Rainer Diaz-Bone, Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne, Frohburgstrasse 3, 6002 
Lucerne, Switzerland; rainer.diazbone@unilu.ch. 
1  For a presentation of classical pragmatism see Bacon (2012), for new French pragmatist 
social sciences see Nachi (2006), Corcuff (2011) and Diaz-Bone (2015). Dosse (1998a, 1998b) 
introduces into French structuralism. 
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social sciences as an alternative not only to neoclassical, mainstream 
economics but also to a prevailing structuralist tradition, which since the 1980s 
did not adequately integrate pragmatist and pluralist conceptions for the 
analysis of contemporary socio-economic phenomena (Dosse 1998c). This kind 
of structuralism was mainly represented by the highly influential sociology of 
Pierre Bourdieu and his collaborators.2 EC was developed not only as an 
alternative to neoclassical economics and Bourdieusian sociology, but emerged 
also in the context of another program in the social sciences that addresses 
anew a recombination of structuralism with pragmatist ways of thinking: the 
research program of Michel Foucault. As Bourdieu did, Foucault early invented 
structuralist concepts as the concept of episteme as deeper structure. But 
contrary to the theory of Bourdieu, in Foucault’s work the concept of structure 
itself is not the final explanatory principle although an important element in the 
socio-historical articulations of knowledge, valuation and coordination.3 
In this contribution, it is argued that Foucault can be regarded as an “ally” of 
EC, because many of his scientific interests, concepts and analytical strategies 
are similar to the ones of EC or could be linked to the EC’s engagement. These 
linkages, so the argument in this contribution, in some cases could improve (or 
already have improved) convention theory or compensate some deficiencies of 
EC. Nowadays, this improvement is most evident in the case of EC’s adaption 
of the notion of “dispositive”, which was recently received from Michel 
Foucault’s work, in which this concept was worked out and linked to his 
concept of power (Favereau 2014). For Foucault, power should not be 
conceived as a substance  
[…] but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to 
“appropriation”, but to dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, 
functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly 
in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; […]. 
(Foucault 1995, 26)  
Power is regarded by Foucault not as substantial in character: it is not the 
property of a class or institution and cannot be accumulated. Power is 
conceived as an effect (also as relational – in the practical sense of being 
                                                             
2  Nowadays, it is strange to see how Bourdieu’s sociology became a representative of a dog-
matic form of structuralism, because it was the early Bourdieu who emphasized practice 
theory as a countervailing position against the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss (Bourdieu 1977, 
1990). But even in France, today’s framing of Bourdieu has changed, see the contributions 
in Fornel and Ogien (2011). 
3  It is also important to highlight the newer position of Luc Boltanski, who is a representative 
of EC and has (together with Arnaud Esquerre) worked out a recombination of pragmatism 
and structuralism, which he calls “pragmatist structuralism“ (structuralisme pragmatique, 
see Boltanski and Esquerre 2017, 2018). This name articulates also EC’s concern to reconcile 
structuralism and pragmatism, but starting with the project of bringing pragmatism back 
into a constellation of social sciences in France, where (Bourdieusian) structuralism was pre-
vailing for long time. 
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immanent, mobilized and effectuated in relations) and not as suppressive in 
character only, but also as a productive force, generating new forms of 
practices and knowledge, therefore Foucault speaks of the power-knowledge-
link (Foucault 1980a, 1980b, 1980c). Foucault related power to the court and to 
juridical practices, and argued that power-based, discursive practices were 
implemented to generate juridical forms of truth (Foucault 2000). 
For EC, Laurent Thévenot (2016) has systematized some of EC’s 
perspectives on power, as the power of conventions to structure coordination or 
the power of valorization introduced by Eymard-Duvernay (2012). However, a 
reception and discussion of Foucault’s concept of power is missing. So far, in 
EC it is not fully recognized that Foucault’s notion of power is not only 
repressive in character (Foucault 1985), but is linked to the generation of new 
ways of living (Foucault 1985) and linked to the production of knowledge 
(Foucault 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1995). Also Foucault integrated objects 
(devices as instruments, architectures), practices and processes into his socio-
historical analyses so that his style of analysis has transformed into a non-
substantialist and non-idealist (structuralist) mode of theorizing. Michel 
Foucault’s work is close to many strands and positions of EC in his analysis of 
dispositives, but also in his studies of technologies of the self. The argument 
developed here is that Foucault’s specific notions of power and discourse 
should be linked to EC’s institutionalist program. This way, Foucault’s 
concepts can satisfy theoretical needs and offer perspectives for the 
institutionalist approach of EC. 
Foucault himself did not work on empirical economic coordination, real 
economies or economic institutions. But in his chapter on exchange (in the pre-
modern centuries) in “The order of things” (Foucault 1989) and his later 
lectures on governmentality, the history of neoliberalism and bio-politics 
(Foucault 2007a, 2008), he studied the genealogy of economic ways of 
thinking and theorizing and he addressed also more specific economic issues 
such as the concept of markets (Foucault 2008) and analyzed the economic 
neoliberalism as a mode of “governmentality” (Laval 2018).4 To relate 
elements of the Foucaultian theory to EC pursues the aim to improve socio-
economic analysis of markets, organizations and law by including Foucaultian 
concepts. But the contribution will also work out the remaining fundamental 
differences (of these theoretical positions and their methodologies) and reflect 
on the preconditions of such an integration. 
The contribution will first present economics of convention, thereby 
highlighting ongoing developments of this approach and circumventing some 
of its contemporary needs (section 2). In this section it is necessary to reflect on 
                                                             
4  For a sketch of Foucault’s analysis of economic theory and the reception by scholars in the 
field of economic history, economics and sociology see Miller and Rose (1990), Vallois (2015) 
and the contributions in Hatchuel et al. (2005). 
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preconditions and prerequisites for the integration of concepts developed 
outside (and before the emergence) of EC. Then, some contributions of Michel 
Foucault to EC will be introduced, which are already part of EC’s theorizing 
(section 3). This part will follow conventionalists’ pathways first developed by 
representatives of EC such as Olivier Favereau and Pierre-Yves Gomez, who 
started to include Foucaultian notions and demonstrated the same affinities of 
these two theoretical projects. Afterwards, other important contributions of 
Foucault will be introduced, which can be evaluated as also relevant for EC’s 
conceptual basis and methodology. The question will be what could advance 
EC, when “meeting” the Foucaultian theory, therefore, the discussion of 
Foucaultian concepts will be selective. For this purpose, first, Foucault’s 
perspective on law will be examined (section 4), afterwards, his work on 
“technologies of the self” are compared to EC’s concept of regimes of 
engagement (section 5) and finally his concepts of episteme and discourse as 
well as the methodology of discourse analysis (section 6) will be related to EC.  
2.   Economics of Convention 
EC has been developed since the 1980s in the Parisian region as an interdisci-
plinary institutionalist approach for the analysis of economic coordination and 
valuation. In recent years, EC has also been recognized outside of France and 
can nowadays be regarded as an international scientific approach. From its 
beginnings, EC was projected not as a coherent paradigm, but as a scientific 
movement, organized around some core concepts and methodological posi-
tions. EC has developed the concept of conventions as logics of coordination. 
The theories of the logician David Lewis (1969) and the economist John M. 
Keynes (1936) have been influential from EC’s start. Both conceived conven-
tions as a result and as a solution to the problem of intersubjective coordina-
tion. Referring to Lewis and Keynes, EC developed the concept of convention 
and the important concept of convention today can be seen as a structuralist 
element within EC. The meaning of institutions and situations is identified by 
convention theory as incomplete. Actors are seen as capable to cope with this 
incompleteness by processes of learning and by applying conventions as prin-
ciples and cognitive resources to interpret and handle institutions and situa-
tions. The pragmatist heritage in EC articulates itself by the assumption of a 
radical and coexisting plurality of conventions. This is another rupture to main-
stream economic institutionalism in which only one principle is prevailing, 
economic efficiency optimized by market exchange between independent indi-
vidual actors. Actors are also seen as capable of evaluating the appropriateness 
of conventions, of questioning, of switching and – if necessary – of combining 
conventions. EC rejects methodological individualism as explanatory strategy. 
Within convention theory, actors are not conceived as equipped with a univer-
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sal and complete rationality. Instead, even rationality is understood as incom-
plete and as dependent on influential conventions as cognitive resources. And 
actors are entangled in situations, which are equipped with objects and cogni-
tive formats, so that agency is ascribed to processes in situations, not to actors 
alone (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). One of the main contributions in the 
field of institutionalism is EC’s view on qualities, based not on intrinsic proper-
ties of objects (as products) but as being the result of a collective construction 
in situations, in which quality is built up on conventions about how to generate 
and evaluate realities – as the perceived quality of products. EC has generated 
two major models, which systemize the plurality of conventions. One model 
was presented by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006), the other one by 
Michael Storper and Robert Salais (1997).5 
EC shares with Foucault’s theory an anti-substantialist ontology: properties, 
qualities and valuations of person, objects and actions are results of practices. 
Also, Michel Foucault has more and more emphasized the importance of prac-
tices of actors as well as the role of materialities and dispositives (Foucault 
1995). For both approaches, explanation is based not on principles external to 
coordination but on constellations and processes in (historical and/or econom-
ic) situations. Although EC has a pragmatist model of actors’ competences, 
actors are not pre-given and self-sufficient units, equipped with preferences and 
independent (calculative) rationalities. Instead, EC focuses methodologically 
on situations and processes as units of analysis. This way, coordination pro-
cesses are distributed practices not controlled by single actors, authorities or 
(other) entities. This is one precondition for EC to adapt Foucaultian concepts. 
Another precondition is the aim to model conceptually the coherence of coor-
dination. This is one of structuralists’ strengths.  
But EC is in some ways different from Foucault’s theoretical project. First, 
it is a scientific movement built on contributions of a greater number of econ-
omists, sociologists, statisticians, historians and others over more than three 
decades now. Of course, Foucault also unfolded his agenda and changed some of 
his methodological and theoretical positions, but his work as process frames a 
more integrated theoretical architecture (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983). Second, 
EC is an approach pragmatist to the core in terms of pluralism. Therefore, EC 
assumes constellations of different conventions as logics of coordination, in-
stead of a wide-ranging system of oppositions and discursive rules organizing 
(historical formations of) discursive practices. Although Foucault’s studies (as 
                                                             
5  The introduction into EC offered here is elementary. See for more detailed presentations the 
contributions in Favereau and Lazega (2002), Diaz-Bone and Salais (2011, 2012), Diaz-Bone 
et al. (2015) and Diaz-Bone and Didier (2016). Foundational publications are the contribu-
tion in the special issue of Revue économique no 41(2) 1989 “Economie des conventions”, 
the contributions in Salais and Thévenot (1986), in Orléan (2004) and in Eymard-Duvernay 
(2006a, 2006b). A newer presentation of EC is the French dictionary of convention theory 
(Batifoulier et al. 2016). 
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Foucault 1989, 1995) demonstrated the difference of deeper structures compar-
ing different epochs, the idea of a radical coexistence of structures and structur-
ing principles is hardly compatible with structuralists’ ways of thinking, which 
was at least Foucault’s earlier position. Third, EC has emerged around the 
empirical analysis of economic topics and problems, especially of economic 
coordination and valuation, which Foucault is not known for and Foucault 
mostly did not include in his work, although in “The order of things” (Foucault 
1989) and in his studies of governmentality (Laval 2018) economic theory is an 
important object of study. One must be aware that Foucault’s analyses of “eco-
nomics” are contributions to the history of the philosophy of economic thinking 
and the socio-historical dynamics of thought systems.6 Foucault did not analyze 
empirically economic institutions and practices as EC as an institutionalist 
approach did. But in other fields such as medicine, psychiatry and the penal 
system, he studied the historical dynamics of institutional arrangements, prac-
tices and discourses (Foucault 1973, 1995, 2006). 
However, EC was invented in France, the country in which the work of 
Michel Foucault became one of the most influential theories not only in the 
humanities but also in the social sciences. As French social sciences in general, 
structuralist theories integrated step by step pragmatist elements and ways of 
thinking.7 Here, the argument is that Foucault’s theory has been part of the 
“theoretical context” during EC’s development and became more and more 
influential and relevant for theoretical projects of EC. 
3.   Existing Foucaultian Influences 
As indicated, EC entails some structuralist moments as the concept of conven-
tion itself. Pierre-Yves Gomez has based his understanding of conventions 
explicitly on a structuralist position, arguing that conventions are the underly-
ing, unquestioned and not justified deeper structures in organizations, which 
enable actors to cooperate efficiently (Gomez 1994, 1996; Gomez and Jones 
2000). Christian Bessy and Francis Chateauraynaud (2014) worked out a spe-
cific version of conventionalism and applied it in the analysis of culture. For 
these authors, the perception and evaluation of cultural objects is structured by 
conventions, which enable actors to identify the authenticity and quality of 
cultural objects. These contributions of Gomez, Bessy and Chateauraynaud 
refer to Foucault’s work and articulate a familiarity of EC’s concept of conven-
                                                             
6  In fact, Foucault was trained in the French tradition of historical epistemology (founded by 
Gaston Bachelard) and was elected as member of the prestigious Collège de France in 1970, 
where he held the chair for the “history of systems of thought” (Eribon 1991). 
7  Therefore, outside of France, the Foucaultian theory is labeled as a “poststructuralism” (as 
the theories of other structuralists as the work of Jacques Derrida). 
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tion to Michel Foucault’s concept of episteme (Foucault 1989). An episteme is 
a deeper and preconscious knowledge structure, which endows manifest 
knowledge with an inner coherence. It is this idea of the organization of the 
coherence of knowledge that makes EC’s concept of convention similar to the 
one of episteme, whereby convention now is understood (also) as a deeper 
knowledge structure. Likewise, the reconstruction of orders of justification, 
which was presented by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), can be interpreted as a 
structuralist practice – although Boltanski and Thévenot do not refer to Fou-
cault. Quality conventions articulate themselves as orders of justification, when 
qualities, values and justice are questioned and justified by actors in situations. 
From this point of view, they are again similar to the concept of episteme, 
because they also build the normative ground for actors, what is right, true and 
evident. Interestingly, conventions as orders of justification were identified in 
situations of dispute and critique (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), while other 
studies of EC – as the paradigmatic analysis of Camembert-production 
(Boisard and Letablier 1987; Boisard 1991) – identified conventions as neces-
sary structuring principles for the “everyday business” of production, distribu-
tion and consumption, because these processes require a common knowledge 
for the interpretation and evaluation of “what is going on” in “normal situa-
tions”. 
Gomez advanced the application of Foucaultian terms in the field of EC. For 
Gomez, conventions are composed out of discourses and material dispositives, 
both relate coordinating actors and inform actors what to do is “normal” 
(Gomez 1996, 193). Here, Foucault’s theory of discourse turns out as an influ-
ence for theorizing EC’s perspective on organizations (enterprises) and mar-
kets. It is important to highlight that EC insists on this dual character of con-
ventions: to be discursive and non-discursive. Conventions cannot be reduced 
to discursive realities, because they have to materialize also in objects (instru-
ments, cognitive formats, machines etc.) to act as a dispositive for economic 
coordination.8 
A convention is not simply enunciated. It is necessary that the information is 
transferred to each individual, so that the assumed adhesion of all others will 
be mediated. The conviction also depends on the manner in which the infor-
mation is transported. The clearest discourse will have practical consequences 
but will only be communicated convincingly if it is communicated physically 
to the actors. […] To study the way by which a convention articulates as pro-
cess of information transfer […] is to perceive it as a material dispositive. 
(Gomez 1996, 194)9 
                                                             
8  See for a short sketch of Gomez‘s theory of organizations (and enterprises) Diaz-Bone 
(2018, chap. 5). 
9  Translated by RDB. 
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The notion of dispositive is widespread in French philosophy and in French 
social sciences. It can be understood as tool or arrangement, which is “at some-
one’s disposal” to exert an effect or to execute an intended purpose. In EC, the 
use of this concept is manifold also. Examples are Olivier Favereau’s concept 
of rules in organizations as collective cognitive dispositives (Favereau 1989) or 
François Eymard-Duvernay’s concepts of dispositives of valorization (Eymard-
Duvernay 2012).10 But the notion is also important for Foucaultian theory and 
more specifically here, because it is related to his concept of power. Foucaulti-
an dispositives organize, mobilize and prolong power effects (Raffnsøe et al. 
2016). It was Favereau who took over the Foucaultian notions of dispositive 
and power, and applied it to the analysis of enterprises. He interprets enterpris-
es as (a) dispositives of valorizing, (b) dispositives for the mobilization of 
collectives and economic coordination, (c) dispositives for the balancing of 
personalizing and standardizing work and (d) dispositives for the development 
of privatized forms of power (Favereau 2014). 
4.   Foucault and Law 
As with economy, law is not one of Foucault’s main objects of inquiry. There-
fore, there is no Foucaultian theory of law.11 But Foucault has included law in 
many of his analyses and related law to political economy.12 Hunt and Wick-
ham (1994, vii) have argued for the field of sociology of law and legal studies 
that Foucault’s work on law still is not systematically recognized. There are 
several contributions of Foucault also to the socio-economic interpretation of 
law, and EC has still to evaluate systematically Foucault’s perspective on law. 
To study the importance of Foucault’s contributions to the analysis of law and 
its possible relevance for EC’s view on economic coordination, political econ-
omy and the analysis of neoliberalism is an important task for EC, because EC 
regards law – like language and money – as one of the main economic institu-
tions (Bessy and Favereau 2003). Also Foucault is interested in issues as cri-
tique, resistance and practices, as EC is. That is why one could expect an im-
provement of EC’s analysis, when EC is informed by Foucaultian perspectives. 
As EC does, Foucault refuses a Marxist standpoint or an individualist perspec-
tive on law (as the law and economy approach does).13  
                                                             
10  See for an overview of conventionalists’ usages of the concept of dispositive Diaz-Bone 
(2017c). 
11  Although Foucault studied the history and genealogy of juridical forms (Foucault 2000). 
12  See the collection of articles on Foucaultian perspectives on law in Golder and Fitzpatrick 
(2010) and in Golder (2013). 
13  For a critique of the approach of law and economics from a conventionalist‘s view see Diaz-
Bone et al. (2015). 
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For Foucault, law is neither a condition for the liberation of the individual, nor 
is it solely the result of class domination. Law cannot be adequately compre-
hended from the standpoints of subjects of action – whether they be based on 
individualism, class, or gender – or from the general structures through which 
everyday life is produced and experienced. Foucault claimed that liberalism, 
Marxism, and standpoints rooted in knowing subjects of action are inadequate 
because they share a “juridico-discursive model of power”. This model limits 
the analysis of law and power because it formulates them as things that are 
possessed by agents of action, as repressive, and as centralized in core struc-
tures such as legal institutions and the state. By contrast, Foucault conceptual-
ized power as it is exercised, as multiple and decentralized and as productive 
of social structures and knowledge. Law is an element in the expansion of 
power or, – more accurately – powers. In modern society, law combines with 
power in various locations in ways that expand patterns of social control, 
knowledge, and the documentation of individuals for institutionally useful 
ends. Ultimately, legality and associated techniques of knowledge and control 
expand to define and to provide empirical knowledge of every aspect, every 
fibre of society. Most especially, legality combines with other discourses to 
form the individual as the locus of ever greater networks of administrative 
control. (Turkel 2010, 170) 
As the quotation emphasizes, for Foucault the analysis of law is closely linked 
to his specific notion of power. And Foucault made different interpretations of 
its role in his work. In “Discipline and punish”, law was identified as a tool of 
power, to manage but also to invent crime and delinquency. Law was not con-
ceived as a civic standard equally available to all citizens, it was interpreted as 
a dispositive of power, which was not applied to liberate individuals, to ration-
alize or to pacify society (Foucault 1995, 257-8). Also, the reality and impact 
of law cannot be grasped by studying law texts alone. Thereby, Foucault refus-
es implicitly the conception of law as a complete institution, guaranteeing its 
meaning solely by its explicitly written substance, i.e. refusing the idea of a 
complete meaning of written law texts. This is a position shared with EC’s idea 
of law (Didry 2002; Diaz-Bone 2018). Like EC, which includes constellations 
of concepts, objects, actors, conventions, etc. in situations, Foucault stresses the 
need to include the other mechanisms present in situations in which law is 
mobilized. 
Law is neither the truth of power nor its alibi. It is an instrument of power 
which is at once complex and partial. The form of law with its effects of pro-
hibition needs to be resituated among a number of other, non-juridical mecha-
nisms. (Foucault 1980, 141) 
The reality of the penalty system is not determined by written law alone, but 
depends on the set of practices of the disciplinary system and “[…] ‘the disci-
plines’ as the characteristic and pervasive forms of power” (Hunt and Wickham 
1994, 46), which are disciplinary “methods” as Foucault demonstrated in his 
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historical analysis of the prison.14 These practices emerged as realities on their 
own, countervailing the classical idea of law. 
The “Enlightment”, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disci-
plines. In appearance, the disciplines constitute nothing more than an infra-
law. They seem to extend the general forms defined by law to the infinitesimal 
level of individual lives; or they appear as methods of training that enable in-
dividuals to become integrated into these general demands. They seem to con-
stitute the same type of law on a different scale, thereby making it more me-
ticulous and more indulgent. The disciplines should be regarded as a sort of 
counter-law. They have the precise role of introducing insuperable asymme-
tries and excluding reciprocities. (Foucault 1995, 222) 
Contrary to Weber’s analysis of law (Weber 1978), Foucault was not interested 
in the analysis of the internal organization of law or its inner rationality. Also 
Foucault argued that legal studies implicitly assume still a unity of law, be-
cause of the idea of law as an instrument of a king or a monarchy (as “royal 
power”), a Roman conception of law, which was renewed in the Middle Ages 
(Foucault 1980b, 94). And the beginning of law as a profession and as theory in 
western societies from the medieval times onwards was linked to the task of 
lawyers to legitimate and to (discursively) defend this royal power (Foucault 
1980b, 95-96). But if different modern institutions, which introduce disciplines 
(as prisons), can act as rule-setter and institutions (organizations) can enforce 
rules, then the acceptance of a state of “legal pluralism” in modern societies is 
the necessary consequence.15 Based on his different idea about power, Foucault 
criticized the conception of power as based on law (Hunt and Wickham 1994, 
41). Step by step, Foucault distanced himself from classical views of the unity 
of law, of law-based mechanisms as the origin of power and law as the result of 
legal actions transferring rights to exert power. 
[…] in the case of the classic, juridical theory, power is taken to be a right, 
which one is able to possess like a commodity, and which one can in conse-
quence transfer or alienate, either wholly or partially, through a legal act or 
through some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through cession 
or contract. Power is that concrete power which every individual holds, and 
whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be es-
tablished. This theoretical construction is essentially based on the idea that the 
constitution of political power obeys the model of a legal transaction involv-
ing a contractual type of exchange (hence the clear analogy that runs through 
all these theories between power and commodities, power and wealth). (Fou-
cault 1980a, 88) 
                                                             
14  The notion of disciplines is specific for Foucault’s analysis of power: “These methods, which 
made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the con-
stant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be 
called 'disciplines‘ […]“ (Foucault 1995, 137). 
15  For the concept of legal pluralism see Merry (1988) or Berman (2009). A more recent per-
spective was offered by Duve (2017) introducing the concept of „multinormativity“.  
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Instead, Foucault has studied the many ways in which different institutions and 
practices exerted their more “fluid” forms of power, of domination and of rule-
enforcing, which cannot be allocated to persons as individual resources.16 In his 
lectures at the Collège de France on bio-politics and governmentality, Foucault 
extended his interpretation of law by arguing that law and punishment is not 
only oriented towards past events (and their punishment), but is also oriented 
towards security and the influence on future behavior (Foucault 2007a, lecture 
1). Foucault’s analysis of the genealogy of thinking in terms of security does 
not postulate a series of phases, but does assume  
[…] as series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques them-
selves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in 
which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, 
the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary 
mechanisms, and mechanisms of security. (Foucault 2007a, 8)  
Also Foucault identified the notion of milieu in his analysis of the genealogy of 
modern governmentality, to which these considerations of government are 
oriented as the unit that is conceived as “the target of intervention for power” 
(Foucault 2007a, 22).17 Initially – until the late Middle Ages – the perspective 
on law was related to the problem of the sovereignty of the monarch, but in the 
following, this perspective changes toward considerations about how law could 
restrict the royal power and guarantee the liberty of individuals, who started to 
conceive themselves as civilians. Law became a critical (discursive) resource 
against an unlimited claim of the “raison d’État”. 
Legal theory and judicial institutions no longer serve as the multiplier, but rather 
as the subtractor of royal power. Thus, from the sixteenth century and 
throughout the seventeenth century we see the development of a series of 
problems, polemics, and battles around, for example, fundamental laws of the 
realm that jurists argue, against raison d’État, cannot be called into question 
by governmental practice or raison d’État. These fundamental laws exist, as it 
were, before the state, since they are constitutive of the state, and so, some ju-
rists say, the king, however absolute his power, must not tamper with them. 
The law constituted by these fundamental laws thus appeared to be outside 
raison d’État and a principle of its limitation. (Foucault 2008, 8; emphasis in 
original) 
For EC, there are several important positions offered by or shared with Fou-
cault’s arguments. As Foucault does, EC refuses the idea of law as a “state-
centered” social reality. Foucault refuses to develop a “theory of the state”, 
because for him, there is no such thing as “a state” although there are processes 
of statehood, and state can only be grasped by the analysis of statist effects. 
                                                             
16  Examples are the analysis of the prison (Foucault 1995), the asylum (Foucault 1965), or the 
clinic (Foucault 1973). 
17  The notion of milieu was also developed as an analytical concept by Georges Canguilhem, 
who was a precursor and teacher of Foucault, see for this influence Laval (2018). 
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The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The 
state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual 
statification (étatisation) or statifications, in the sense of incessant transactions 
which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of 
finance, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of 
control, relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so on. 
[…] The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple 
governmentalities. (Foucault 2008, 77) 
Here, the different conventions of the state, as proposed by Storper and Salais 
(1997, 207-8) bring in a very similar perspective on “state”. Because for EC, 
state is not a given institutional arrangement or the last guarantee for the en-
forcement and unity of law, but a way of thinking how to anticipate possible 
interventions of national legal or administrative dispositives to intervene, and 
how to be present in situations of economic coordination. Storper and Salais 
emphasize an existing plurality of conventions of the state: the convention of 
the absent state, the convention of the external state and the convention of the 
situated state (Storper and Salais 1997, 210). As with state, Foucault and EC 
both emphasize also the co-existence of different legal practices, rule-enforcing 
practices and dispositives and therefore a plurality of legal reasoning (Didry 
2002; Favereau 2010; Bessy 2015).18 Law is only one social realm, in which 
justifications are mobilized but also requested (Thévenot 1992), and law is only 
one resource for critique and justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), but 
of course not specific for this (Foucault 2007b).19 As EC has done (Didry 
2002), Foucault (2007a) regarded the social conflicts and discourses about law 
– its adequacy, its nature, and its legitimacy – as an important object under 
study. The meaning of the institution of law and its usages are not guaranteed 
or fully specified by the law as text alone – a position EC shares with Fou-
cault’s perspective on law and which EC has presented clearly in its analysis of 
contracts and rules as incomplete in terms of meaning (Favereau 1997, 2004; 
Diaz-Bone 2018). The notion of milieu corresponds methodologically to EC’s 
concept of the (socio-historical) situation. This correspondence could also be 
regarded as a link between Foucault’s identification of this notion and EC’s 
methodological approach. Instead of analyzing the effect of law on individual 
behavior (as economic analysis of law does, because of its methodological 
individualism), EC focuses on the effects of law on situations (Foucault’s “mi-
lieus”) and on law as a dispositive for economic coordination in situations. But 
                                                             
18  See also the contributions in Diaz-Bone, Didry and Salais (2015). All contributions available 
at: <https://www.gesis.org/en/hsr/full-text-archive/2015/401-law-and-conventions/>. 
19  Foucault’s notion of critique is more general “I would therefore propose, as a very first 
definition of critique, this general characterization: the art of not being governed quite so 
much” (Foucault 2007, 45). See for a conventionalist perspective on social critique Boltanski 
and Thévenot (2006). See for a comparison of convention theory’s and Foucault’s notion of 
critique Diaz-Bone (2017b). 
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Foucault did not choose this unit for methodological reasons. Instead, he identi-
fied this unit as an element in political economic discourses. Another methodo-
logical aspect, which is important when relating EC to Foucault’s work, is the 
reluctance to regard the internal structure of law as rationally organized and to 
consider law possibilities to perform as an efficient external constraint for 
economic coordination. Methodologically, convention theorists approach law 
in real situations, when enacted by coordinating individuals, adopting the ac-
tors’ point of view as mobilized in empirical situations. As Foucault did, EC 
focuses on the practices, how law is enacted, engaged and applied in (socio-
historical) situations. 
For Foucault, the importance of law as a dispositive of the modern form of 
direct governance of the individual has been decreasing since the advent of 
neoliberal economist thinking (Foucault 2008). Instead, law has developed as a 
dispositive to limit the power of the sovereign (government) and as a disposi-
tive for the cost calculation of deviant behavior (Foucault 2008, lecture 10). 
And its importance has increased in terms of establishing and controlling mar-
kets, thereby establishing competition as new penetrating principle to organize 
the whole society.20 In this regard, law has transformed its role in neoliberal 
theory (Foucault 2008).21 Foucault interpreted neoliberal strategy as an indirect 
strategy to influence individuals replacing the strategies of the disciplines, 
which accessed individuals directly. Neoliberal government is characterized by 
implementing competition and markets in everyday situations. Performance on 
markets becomes the new test of reality and markets are constituted as the new 
sites of the formation of truth (Foucault 2008, lecture 2). Government is exert-
ed by influencing the milieus of individuals, which have to adapt to competi-
tion and markets. To become a subject in neoliberal times, individuals have to 
conceive themselves and act as entrepreneurs of themselves (Foucault 2008; 
Miller and Rose 1990; Laval 2018). Since the end of the 1970s, Foucault there-
fore directed his research to the discourses, problematizations and practices of 
self-conduct, self-formation and “technologies of the self” and their genealogy 
(Foucault 1985, 1986, 1988, 2010). Here, another convergence with develop-
ments in convention theory occurs. 
                                                             
20  It is more specific to the German version of neoliberalism, ordoliberalism, which offers law 
an important role in framing and controlling markets, but ordoliberalism refuses law as an 
instrument to influence economic decisions (Foucault 2008, lecture 6-7).  
21  See for an interpretation of Foucault’s different conceptualizations of law Golder and 
Fitzpatrick (2009). 
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5.   Regimes of Engagement and Technologies of the Self 
The convergence results in the reorientation towards individuals’ strategies to 
cope with situations, which are free of strong prescriptive norms, external 
disciplinary techniques, or structuring discursive orders. In situations of this 
kind, individuals have to invent “regimes of engagement” (Thévenot 2006, 
2014) or “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1988) as strategies and resources 
to develop forms of living, which enable and empower individuals in their 
personal and material environment to coordinate with objects, plans, problems, 
and concepts in ways so that individuals keep their sovereignty and integrity.  
Michel Foucault discovered the specific situation in the classical antique 
Greek culture, in which young men had had sexual relationships with older 
men in the Greek elite. Both had to be careful to respect the other’s integrity in 
terms of not dominating or being dominated, because this would have under-
mined the perspective of the younger men to become possible future leaders. In 
difference to the cultural system of norms and values, which existed for women 
and for other (inferior and dominated) social groups, these relationships in the 
Greek elite were possible, but did not take place in an existing and prescriptive 
frame of rules (Foucault 1985, 1986, 2010). Foucault has reconstructed the 
normative problematizations with which individuals started because they had to 
cope with the possible negative consequences, which could emerge out of 
individuals’ behavior in situations without a pre-given system of norms and 
values. These problematizations were driving forces for the antique Greco-
Roman philosophy. Foucault has called these individual practices “technolo-
gies of the self” and related them to other social technologies. 
[…] we must understand that there are four major types of these “technolo-
gies”, each a matrix of practical reason: (1) technologies of production, which 
permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign 
systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) 
technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit 
them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) tech-
nologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or 
with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and 
souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in 
order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or im-
mortality. (Foucault 1988, 18) 
In modern times, there are many similar new situations coming up, in which (in 
this regard privileged) individuals have to explore new principles and frames 
for their way of living, because they have (cultural, normative, material, finan-
cial, etc.) degrees of freedom and the need to develop principles and frames as 
forms of living. Foucault invented the notion of “arts of existence” for this 
search. 
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I am referring to what might be called the “arts of existence”. What I mean by 
the phrase are those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only 
set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to 
change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeu-
vre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. 
(Foucault 1985, 10-11) 
Laurent Thévenot has presented a partly similar perspective on individuals 
acting in their personal environments. He distinguished three “regimes of en-
gagement”, which act as ways in which individuals coordinate their way of 
living in their personal environment. The parallel to the Foucaultian perspec-
tives can be found in the shared property of the studied situations, which are 
not structured by existing and publicly available systems of norms and values, 
to which individuals are subjected. In a similar way as Foucault did, Thévenot 
worked out a sociological approach to situations in which principles and forms 
of living are to be developed by individuals, because they cannot rely on and 
are freed from societal and publicly dominant prescriptions as what to do is just 
and adequate. Thévenot identified the regimes of engagement as “grammar”. 
These regimes reside “below” the level of orders of justification (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006). The latter can be mobilized in public dispute to criticize or to 
justify worth, quality, justice, or adequacy (of persons, objects, actions, etc.). 
Regimes of engagement work differently. They are ways of coordinating the 
individually planed ways, in the immediate intimate environment or in a per-
sonal exploratory mood (Thévenot 2006, 2014). Thévenot has characterized 
different regimes of engagement. 
Regimes of engagement strongly differ from one another in scope, the kind of 
good they foster and possible mutuality, from the ease obtained by close per-
sonal familiarization to qualification for the common good. […]. Engaging in 
personal familiarity reassures through past habituation, this ease being war-
ranted by customized personal belongings and a personalized environment. 
Engaging in an individual plan implies a projection of the individual will into 
the future, granted by an environment suitable for functional utilization. These 
two ways of engaging with the environment involve contrasting kinds of self-
assurance, and time orientation. They also rely on proper environmental ar-
rangements that differ strikingly. […] Below the level of an individual pro-
jecting herself in a plan or a strategy, […] we can usefully identify another re-
gime of engaging, one distinct from familiarizing. Among various 
contemporary bodily expressions of discontent, some may be aggrandized into 
inspiration worth and artistic manifestations […], while others may stay at the 
level of a deeply idiosyncratic and emotional experience of discovering the 
world, which led us to identify […] the regime of engaging in exploration, its 
dynamics, particular mode of evaluation and relation to the environment. In 
contrast to the two previous ones, this regime is exclusively present-oriented. 
Value is placed on surprise and the assurance of an excited self depends on the 
unflagging rejuvenation of the environment – including one’s body – which 
has to be arranged to produce the shock of newness. (Thévenot 2014, 13/15; 
emphases in original) 
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When practices in situations are structured by these regimes, individuals do not 
have to adapt to pre-given collective social expectations. The following table 
presents the three introduced regimes. 
Table 1: Three Regimes of Engagements 
 Engaging in an 
individual plan  
Engaging in  
familiarity 
Engaging in  
exploration  




Information format functional usual, congenial surprising 
Capacity, power autonomous, willful attached to curious, explorer 





Source: Thévenot (2014, 13). 
 
Comparing Foucault’s contribution with Thévenot’s, the importance of the 
(self-)management and the transformation of the self (soul) in Foucault’s ap-
proach and the more elaborated role of objects in Thévenot’s approach show 
striking differences. But besides these differences, again, these contributions 
are parallel developments in convention theory and in Foucault’s research, 
tracking the strategies and practices, which individuals have to develop, when 
facing situations, which are in a specific way non-societal, because they are 
more open and offer new spaces that individuals have to approach. Both ap-
proaches open the way to analyze practices of self-esteem and self-appreciation 
in situations and are based on interaction with objects and concepts. However, 
still a more profound comparison of these works is needed, scrutinizing the 
perspectives of Foucault’s ideas for the research agenda of convention theory. 
But the argument here is not only about comparisons, it is also about conver-
gences and application in the field of economic analysis.22 Foucaultian technol-
ogies of the self are nowadays part of the economic behavior and self-
management of individuals and of governance of the economy. Foucault him-
self tried to apply this perspective of individuals’ technologies of the self to 
neoliberal governance. 
The individual‘s life must be lodged, not within a framework of a big enter-
prise like the firm or, if it comes to it, the state, but within the framework of a 
multiplicity of diverse enterprises connected up to and entangled with each 
other, enterprises which are in some-way ready to hand for the individual, suf-
ficiently limited in their scale for the individual's actions, decisions, and 
choices to have meaningful and perceptible effects, and numerous enough for 
him not to be dependent on one alone. And finally, the individual‘s life itself – 
with his relationships to his private property, for example, with his family, 
                                                             
22  Pierre-Yves Gomez applied the Foucaultian perspective of the technologies of the self to the 
modern concept of the entrepreneur and worked out different forms of the “aesthetics of 
the entrepreneur” (Gomez 2005). 
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household, insurance, and retirement – must make him into a sort of perma-
nent and multiple enterprise. (Foucault 2008, 241) 
Peter Miller and Nicolas Rose followed Foucault’s perspective and also applied 
his theory to the analysis of modern economies and forms of governance.  
The self-regulating capacities of individuals are to be aligned with economic 
objectives through the kinds of loose and indirect mechanisms that we have 
described earlier: the capacities of language to translate between rationalities, 
programmes, technologies and self-regulatory techniques, and the particular 
persuasive role of expertise. Significantly, these programmes do not merely 
seek to instrumentalize the aspirations of workers, but also seek to act upon 
the selves of managers. There is no opposition between the modes of self-
presentation required of the manager and the ethics of the personal self, indeed 
becoming a better manager is to become a better self, and innumerable train-
ing courses and seminars operate in these terms. The values of self-realization, 
the skills of self-presentation, self-direction and self-management are both 
personally seductive and economically desirable. (Miller and Rose 1990, 26-27) 
For some years now societies have been inventing technologies of the self as 
technologies of self-quantification and self-optimizing, which could be studied 
in more elaborate ways by combining Thévenot’s and Foucault’s concepts. 
Also, questions as how to relate these regimes of engagement and technologies 
of the self to conventions and orders of justification will be important to under-
stand the plurality of ways in which economies include and mobilize individu-
als as consumers, employees, evaluators, etc. 
6.   Discourse and Discourse Analysis 
Economy (and also economics) has a discursive reality – in fact it is in im-
portant parts “discursive” itself. Without discourses economies would not be 
possible and would not exist (Diaz-Bone and Krell 2015; Miller and Rose 
1990). The approach of convention theory on economic coordination nowadays is 
known for its analysis of the social construction of quality and worth (Storper 
and Salais 1997; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Critique and justification are 
core mechanisms, which actors bring in situations in which quality and worth 
are questioned, needed to be measured, identified, readjusted, or defended. It is 
evident that the practices of critique and justification are discursive in nature, 
i.e. they consist of discursive strategies, rely on discourse elements and maneu-
vers in discursive orders. In some projects, convention theorists have applied 
conceptual and methodological tools to access the discursive reality of coordi-
nation and of the construction of quality and worth. There are conventionalist 
applications of quantitative linguistic procedures by Marchal and Remillion 
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(2012) or Bessis and Remillion (2012).23 Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) used 
coding software to identify the quantitative distribution of categories that are 
linked to different orders of justifications.24 There are some more studies that 
analyze texts to identify (quality) conventions and orders of justification as 
discursive structures.25 However, still the majority of EC’s analyses of texts are 
not based on an elaborated methodology that translates convention theorists’ 
thinking into a coherent way of identifying conventions/orders of justification 
in discourse.  
Although Bessy and Favereau (2003; Bessy 2017) claimed language and 
discourses to be foundational institutions for economy (as law), EC has been 
reluctant to integrate discourse analytic concepts and discourse analytic meth-
odologies. One could assume that the pragmatist reorientation within the new 
French social sciences – to which EC belongs – has caused skepticism against 
discourse analysis, because in France discourse analysis was closely related to 
structuralism. A possible reason for EC’s reservation could be its critique of 
structuralism, which is the objection that structuralism reduces economic coor-
dination to language use. Even though some publications of Foucault contrib-
uted to the scientific movement of structuralism (Dosse 1998a, 1998b), this 
categorization can present a wrong picture of Foucault’s contributions. From 
his early books on, Foucault combined the historical analysis of the institution-
al field, its organization and its related discourses – as in his early analysis of 
the medical field (Foucault 1975). To separate parts of his work where he studies 
discourses from other parts where he includes historical change, institutional 
structures and material dispositives, misrecognizes Foucault’s combination of 
structuralist and pragmatist methodology, integrating the analysis of discursive 
practices, non-discursive practices, techniques, architecture, and (other) materi-
alities.26 
Again, some Foucaultian concepts are close to concepts of EC or have influ-
enced EC’s theorizing. Foucault’s theory offers a notion of deep structure and 
internal coherence of cultural practices, which is very close to the conviction of 
convention theorists that convention-based (economic) coordination is pat-
terned by conventions and that the outcomes of convention-based coordination 
                                                             
23  These studies applied the program ALCESTE to group words to clusters, which could be 
related to orders of justifications/quality conventions. 
24  In their study Boltanski and Chiapello applied the program PROSPERO, a lexicographical and 
interactive coding software, to relate categories to orders of justification.  
25  See for a sketch of discourse analytic influences in EC and for more references Diaz-Bone 
(2018, chap. 11.5). 
26  An influential example for this misleading reception of Foucault’s body of work is the 
introduction written by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983), who divided Foucault’s work in two 
parts, the earlier marked by archaeology as methodological position and the later marked by 
genealogy. The argument is that Foucault’s work in the first period was more structuralist, 
while his work in the second period integrated the socio-dynamic and historical change.  
HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  326 
are patterned in the same way. Therefore, one must be aware that the concept 
of convention itself can still be regarded as a structuralist concept. 
[…] there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, at 
least) than the process of establishing an order among things; […] in fact, 
there is no similitude and no distinction, even for the wholly untrained percep-
tion, that is not the result of a precise operation and of the application of a pre-
liminary criterion. A “system of elements” – a definition of the segments by 
which the resemblances and differences can be shown, the types of variation 
by which those segments can be affected, and, lastly, the threshold above 
which there is a difference and below which there is a similitude – is indispen-
sable for the establishment of even the simplest form of order. Order is, at one 
and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden 
network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that 
which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, 
a language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests 
itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its 
expression. […] The fundamental codes of a culture – those governing its lan-
guage, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the 
hierarchy of its practices – establish for every man, from the very first, the 
empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at 
home. (Foucault 1989, xxi-xxii) 
Foucault condensed this perspective with his notion of episteme, which is not 
to be confused with the idea of (scientific) knowledge, but must be understood 
as the deeper pattern of collective knowledge and cognition in an epoch, field, 
or area (see section 3). The consequence is that an episteme also articulates 
itself as deeper structure of the corresponding discourses. For EC, the analysis 
of statistical classifications has been one of its foundational moments (Diaz-
Bone 2018).27 Classifications cannot be built out of logical considerations 
alone, nor can they be built out of empirical data alone (Desrosières and Thé-
venot 1979). Instead, as Foucault (1989) argued, an episteme as a deeper struc-
ture is needed as architectural principle for the classification. Desrosières has 
called this principle later on the “conventions of equivalence” (Desrosières 
1998; Diaz-Bone 2017a). The episteme and the principle of convention are 
similar in regard to organizing categories and classifications. Categories and 
classifications are the infrastructure for founding quality and worth as well as 
the infrastructure for related practices as valorizing. Despite these parallels, 
Foucaultian discourse analysis could advance convention theory’s research in 
different ways. Foucault’s model of discourse is neither a formal grammar, nor 
a textual structure or a narrative. A discourse is a supra-individual form of 
practice, generating the meaning of words, the conceptualization of objects, the 
modes how to participate as speaker and the thinkable strategies. As EC does, 
                                                             
27  See for one of the first explicit references of convention theory to the Foucaultian analysis 
of episteme Desrosières and Thévenot (1979). 
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Foucaultian discourse analysis regards meaning not as the intended product of 
an individual subject’s will, but as outcome of a collective social process in 
situations. Contrary to EC, which starts with capable actors, coordinating in 
situations, Foucault regarded a discourse as a unity of its own, as a regulated 
and in this way institutionalized form of supra-individual practice. 
We sought the unity of discourse in the objects themselves, in their distribu-
tion, in the interplay of their differences, in their proximity or distance – in 
short, in what is given to the speaking subject; and, in the end, we are sent 
back to a setting-up of relations that characterizes discursive practice itself; 
and what we discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a group of 
rules that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity. (Foucault 
1989, 51; emphasis in original) 
The interesting potential, brought in by the Foucaultian discourse model is the 
approach to study the rules that form the more detailed strategies (as critique 
and justification), influential speakers’ positions, the mobilization of meanings 
and the way objects are set in relation to each other (classified and valorized). 
So far, EC (a) grasps the articulation of conventions as deeper structure apply-
ing formal methodologies, whose results are interpreted qualitatively and ex 
post or (b) applies a kind of ad hoc interpretation of textual data and infers 
from it to underlying conventions. Instead, Foucaultian discourse analysis 
reconstructs first the set of discursive practices and then reconstructs conven-
tions as principles of the coherence of these rules. Engaging the discourse 
analytic approach (in comparison to only applying the epistemic concept) 
bridges the gap of EC, which has a model of deeper structures (orders of justi-
fication, quality conventions, conventions of equivalence), but lacks appropri-
ate intermediary concepts and a related methodological approach to analyze in 
detail how these deeper structures interrelate with discursive practices and 
discourse elements. Foucault intended to extend the analysis of discursive 
practices to the realm of non-discursive practices. For him, discourse analysis  
[…] also reveals relations between discursive formations and non-discursive 
domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes). 
These rapprochements are not intended to uncover great cultural continuities, 
nor to isolate mechanisms of causality. […] it tries to determine how the rules 
of formation that govern it – and which characterize the positivity to which it 
belongs – may be linked to non-discursive systems: it seeks to define specific 
forms of articulation. (Foucault 1989, 179-180)28 
It is this connection to non-discursive domains and non-discursive practices 
which opens a new way for EC to the analysis of power effects, exerted by 
discourses and reaching out to other realms. But there are obstacles when com-
bining EC with Foucaultian discourse analysis. For Foucault, discourses are 
                                                             
28  In his book, Foucault (1989) has named his methodology “archaeology“, but it became 
famous as (a version of) discourse analysis. 
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unities and entities on their own (Foucault 1989), while EC sees convention-
based coordination processes in situations as realities empirical analysis has to 
start with and as units of analysis.29 A conventionalist integration of elements 
of Foucault’s model of discourse has to analyze discourses as embedded in 
situations and structured by conventions (as deeper structures) and influenced 
by effects, which overarch situations, as the interventions of intermediaries, 
and the impact of dispositives and (cognitive) forms. In fact, not only theory 
(integrating concepts in a coherent way), but also methodology (integrating 
research practices into a coherent methodology) is another platform for the 
integration of Foucaultian discourse analysis in empirical approaches of EC. 
Once again, one can find a similar approach to historical analysis and explana-
tion. In his historical studies of the dynamics of discourses and institutions, 
Foucault has refused to think in terms of external causes to historical develop-
ments. Instead, he proposed to focus on the dynamic interrelation of struggles 
and strategies, in which different discourses (knowledge) are involved. He 
called this methodological perspective “genealogy”, which avoids the reduction 
of historical analysis to the analysis of meanings, signifying structure, or dis-
course alone. 
The problem is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the net-
works and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along 
which they are connected and engender one another. From this follows a re-
fusal of analyses couched in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of sig-
nifying structures, and a recourse to analyses in terms of the genealogy of re-
lations of force, strategic developments, and tactics. Here, I believe one's point 
of reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) and signs, 
but to that of war and battle. (Foucault 1980c, 114) 
Power, critique, and resistance therefore are main driving forces in the explana-
tion applied in Foucaultian historical studies. He avoided enumerating single 
causes as “motor” of historical dynamics, but examines powers, strategies, 
events and their relations. Some studies of EC have developed a similar meth-
odology. The historical analysis of the emergence of the category of unem-
ployment and the dynamics of labor institution is exemplary for EC (Salais et 
al. 1999). In their study, Salais, Baverez and Reynaud investigated how the 
new statistical category co-emerged together with new institutions and practic-
es of industrial labor organization. The institutionalist explanation does not rely 
on simple driving forces for this transformation, but reconstructs the historical 
dynamic as co-construction. Both positions dismiss simple causal models, but 
also subjectivist, materialist, or culturalist explanations. Although in EC the 
                                                             
29  Linked to this difference is the difference in the explanatory logic. EC is based on a method-
ological situationalism, while Foucaultian discourse analysis is based on a methodological 
holism. EC’s methodological situationalism results in the rejection of a multi-level model of 
explanation (with a distinction of micro-level, meso-level and macro-level), see Thévenot 
(2001, 418). 
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concept of power is still marginal, the explanatory strategy of Foucaultian 
studies and EC’s analysis have important elements in common, because they 
explain historical change and the emergence of new phenomena out of interre-
lations of entities and processes.  
7.   Perspectives 
EC as part of the new French social sciences (Corcuff 2011) emerged as scien-
tific countermovement against the tradition of French structuralism, which was 
prevailing in the humanities and the social sciences. Although EC entails struc-
turalist elements (with the concept of convention itself) and presumably struc-
turalist theories, in the same way as the Foucaultian body of work entails 
pragmatist elements (as the concept of discursive practice), EC has mostly been 
reluctant to integrate Foucaultian concepts. This contribution argues not simply 
for a comparison of EC and Foucault’s theory, but for an appreciation of some 
of Foucault’s contributions to compensate deficits or to enhance the approach 
of EC. As shown, EC has already started to inspect and to integrate some Fou-
caultian perspectives (section 3). Convention theory is not a paradigm or scien-
tific school, it should be conceived as a scientific movement open to conceptual 
integrations of other approaches (while respecting aspects of theoretical and 
methodological coherence, as argued in section 6). In France, EC sometimes is 
combined with positions of regulation theory (Boyer and Saillard 2005). Regu-
lation theory – despite its problems, because of its marxist beginnings – still 
keeps the state-centered perspective and has kept a solely macro-economic 
approach, which both EC and Foucault resolved.30 But the contributions to the 
socio-historical dynamics of institutional fields presented by Foucault (1965, 
1973, 1995) and his lectures on political economy and the history of govern-
mentality, especially with the important genealogy of neoliberalism (Foucault 
2007a, 2008), should make convention theorists consider the work of Foucault 
as a true “ally” and possibly a superior alternative to regulation theory. In Ger-
many, EC is sometimes combined with positions of Bourdieu’s sociology, for 
example to analyze segments of social fields with the concept of quality con-
ventions (Diaz-Bone 2018). Again, the combination of convention theory and 
Foucaultian discourse analysis offers a perspective for an improvement of the 
analysis of social fields. Especially Foucaultian discourse analysis should be 
regarded as a candidate, to be developed and applied in the theoretical frame of 
convention theory to elaborate EC’s capacity to analyze conventions as deeper 
structures, and to examine the discursive microphysics of critique and justifica-
                                                             
30  For example, “accumulation regimes” in regulation theory could easily be reinterpreted as 
modes of governance from a Foucaultian perspective. 
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tion (in situations of coordination with tensions), but also of the social con-
struction of quality and worth (in ordinary situations of coordination). 
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